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BEYOND STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY: 
Dutch questions about openness, inequalities and 
cumulations 
Wout Ultee 
Why stratification questions pret:etle mobility questions 
Among the early members of the International Sociological 
Association's Research Committee 28 on Social Stratification 
and Mobility, Van Heek (1945: 35-36) most succinctly stated the 
sequence in which questions in this field are to be answered. 
In a monograph on the town of Enschede, the Nether lands, Van 
Heek listed four consecutive questions1: 
1) With which yardsticks are the inhabitants of a society 
to be divided into strata? 
2) What does the distribution of a society's members over 
these strata look like? 
3) To what extent do persons move between strata? 
4) Which factors influence this mobility? 
Glass's (1954: 3-10) set of questions on social mobility in 
Britain is decidedly less lucid. In 1958, when reviewing Dutch 
results obtained so far, Van Heek & Kuiper stated that the 
consequences of mobility, for both group solidarity and 
individual adjustment, had remained unexplored. 
Questions sometimes presuppose answers to other questions. In 
Van Reek's sequence, to establish causes (and effects) of 
mobility, movements must already have been established. To 
determine whether persons moved into their present stratum, 
one must already know that stratum. And it is impossible to 
assign persons to strata without ftrst having delimited these 
strata. As mobility is movement between strata, mobility 
questions have to build on answers to stratification questions. 
Thus one reason why RC28 was named "stratification and 
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mobility'' and not "mobility and stratification". 
Even though Van Heek's sequence is 40 years old, it is useful 
for stock taking. Did different generations of RC28 give 
diverging answers to its first question? Did later ones follow it 
better than earlier ones? Have defmitive answers now been 
given to its last question? Are there difficulties in answering 
any of its questions? With these queries, this paper's next 
paragraph takes stock of three RC28 generations. 
This paper's central paragraph sets out lines for future 
research by correcting and extending Van Heek's sequence. 
Given difficulties with some of its questions, how should these 
questions be improved? How to press on after its last question? 
Which questions should be added to it now? The argument 
holds that mobility questions are to be generalized into 
openness questions. There should also be a return to stratifica-
tion questions, especially on inequalities and cumulative effects. 
It is desirable to return to stratification questions on account 
of the second reason that RC28 was named "stratification and 
mobility". Behind that name lurks the notion that mobility 
inhibits stratification. This idea has not been implemented, does 
not tell the whole story, and is actually misleading. 
The other main paragraph of this paper consists of analytical 
exercises on Dutch data sets. It addresses questions figuring in 
Van Heek's improved and elongated sequence. The ftnal 
paragraph explores the relationship between theoretical 
sociology and the field of stratification and mobility, gauging 
the self-sufficiency of the latter erea. 
Taking stock: the field of mobility without strotificaJion 
Prestige or class? Why not also income? 
Van Reek's answer to his first question was a scale for occu-
pational prestige. Such a scale also figured in Blau & Duncan 
(1967), the exemplar of the second generation. Whereas Van 
Heek improvised when stumbling upon occupational titles absent 
from prestige scales, Blau & Duncan used an index for all 
occupations. Influential studies of the third generation grouped 
persons into classes after the market and employment situation 
of their occupation (Goldthorpe, 1980). 
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The issue of class versus prestige is to be defused by the argu-
ment that more than 67 varieties of stratification and mobility 
may exist. Most (production and consumption) goods are scarce, 
and stratification is about inequality in any scarce good's 
distribution. There is certainly no necessity to restrict 
questions to persons with a job. Given the high unemployment 
in various western industrial nations in the eighties, (un-
)employment mobility is a prime research topic. 
If a free choice could be made about the kind of mobility to 
be studied, neither occupational prestige nor class mobility 
would be chosen. If orthodox surveys would yield reliable 
indicators of a person's present income and the past income of 
that person's parents, income mobility might be the most 
frequently addressed question. The distribution of many a 
consumption good is derived from that of income. In addition, 
one of the marginals of an income mobility table pertains to 
the income distribution of a society at a certain point in time. 
Analysis of income mobility tables provides answers to 
questions about income mobility and inequality. Economists have 
studied inequality in an income distribution for quite some 
time. Indeed, Atkinson, Bourguignon & Morrison (1988) are 
implementing a project on comparative earnings mobility. 
An inventory of answers to Van Heek's first question shows 
various valuable ones. It suggests that the first question is not 
the yardstick by which individuals are to be divided into strata. 
It is whether instruments exist, applicable in studies with 
limited time and money, for measuring the strata persons 
belong to at various dates in their lives. 
Neglecting questions about unequal distributions 
Of all features of an income distribution economists single out 
that of inequality (Pen, 1971). In RC28 a distribution of 
individuals after occupational prestige is hardly ever charac-
terized this way. Also, whether the structure of occupations 
polarized, upgraded or downgraded in the 20th century (Form 
1987), has until now remained a stray question. In the 
literature distributions are left to speak for themselves. So 
much for the answers to the second question of Van Heek's 
sequence. 
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Of course, some members of RC28 showed a concern with dif-
ferences between the marginals of a mobility table. Yet others 
treated these differences as non-problems. This situation can be 
traced back to a criticism of one interpretation of marginal 
differences (Duncan, 1966). 
This interpretation holds that differences between the marginals 
of a father-son mobility table indicate changes in occupational 
structures. According to Duncan, the marginal of that table for 
son's present occupation pertains to an historical distribution. 
That for their father's occupation does not: it refers to various 
points in time, and leaves out men without sons, while those 
with sons are represented according to the number of sons. 
Marginal differences do not stand for changes in occupational 
structures. Thus Duncan's criticism. Exit questions about 
marginal differences. 
Sociologists address questions about father-son and career 
mobility. Does Duncan's criticism also apply to career mobility? 
As McFarland (1970) argued and Duncan acknowledged (Duncan, 
Featherman & Duncan, 1972: 209), it does not. Since father-to-
son mobility still attracts more attention than career mobility, 
it remains necessary to repeat this point. 
Duncan himself (1966: 62-63) provided an alternative and more 
fruitful interpretation of marginal differences. It now may be 
phrased as follows. Cells of a mobility table inform about 
outcomes of competition between persons of different origins to 
achieve or avoid various jobs (Goldthorpe, 1980: 77). Differen-
ces between marginals tell about the competitive situation 
itsel£ Sometimes more prizes are distributed than the number 
of old prize-winners participating, sometimes less. In the ftrst 
case, the "competitive balance" (Ultee & Luijkx 1986) or 
"opportunity structure" is favorable, in the second unfavorable. 
If employers take the social origin of prospective employees 
into account, they rank them after origin. The resulting 
distribution is the formerly misinterpreted marginal of a 
mobility table. 
RC28's third generation paid less attention to loglinear 
modelling of marginal differences than of cell frequencies. 
While Hauser et al. (1975) argued in favour of explaining 
marginal differences, and Hauser (1978) presented parameters 
for cell frequencies, Hauser & Grusky (1988) present models for 
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marginal differences. Expanding upon Hope (1981), IDtee & 
Luijkx (1986) introduce·"polarization and compression" models 
for marginal differences. When applied to the marginals of an 
intragenerational mobility table, parameters of these models 
indicate whether inequality is becoming larger or smaller. These 
models thus answer inequality questions of economists. 
Technical studies have not as yet addressed the issue of 
whether parameters for marginal differences from loglinear 
models (and for Hope's halfway model equalizing marginals) are 
related to well-known measures for inequality. Only after that 
issue has been settled, will it be possible to address Van 
Reek's second question at an adequate level. 
How to characterize mobility patterns 
In the third generation it became clear how Van Reek's third 
question is to be answered. The first generation answered the 
question of how much mobility there is in a society by 
providing the percentage of its population that was mobile. It 
then appeared that percentages do not tell the right story 
about a society's openness. They are polluted by effects of 
differences between the marginals of a mobility table. In the 
second generation standardized regression coefficients elimina-
ted effects of marginal differences. This was fully appreciated 
in the third generation, when parameters of loglinear models 
for cell frequencies were also found to oust them (Hauser, 
1978: 923). Loglinear parameters were said to pertain to 
"relative mobility chances" or "social fluidity" (Goldthorpe, 
1980:57). 
Still no answers to questions about causes of mobility 
Van Reek's fourth question was about causes of mobility. From 
the outset it was clear that no test was possible of the thesis 
that individuals from a society's lower strata show more upward 
mobility if they attend school during a period their government 
offers them more generous scholarships. In the fifties, the 
condition that is stipulated by this hypothesis did not differ 
between older and younger cohorts in the Netherlands. This 
hypothesis therefore remained to be tested by comparing Dutch 
data with those of countries differing in generosity of 
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scholarships to stu9.ents from the lower strata. RC28 had been 
founded for reasons of this type. 
RC28's first generation was enthusiastic about comparative 
research. Glass's monograph on mobility in Britain from 1954 
was followed in 1956 by Lipset & Zetterberg's comparison of 10 
industrial countries. The second generation, after a much longer 
period, yielded a comparison of path models for the stratifica-
tion process in a similar number of industrial countries 
(Treiman & Yip, 1989). Milller stated of the third generation: 
" ... a more skeptical view of the feasibility and meaningfulness 
of comparisons of stratification and mobility patterns among 
large numbers of societies has prevailed" (Rogoff Rams<¥y & 
Milller, 1983: 25). 
This skepticism had its price. Erikson & Goldthorpe (1987) 
compared industrial countries only if they could obtain strongly 
similar recodings of occupational titles into classes. Since the 
number of countries dwindled to nine, few degrees of freedom 
are left for fitting models accounting for the mobility patterns 
of the various countries. Is there a way out of this dilemma of 
choosing between a historically informed comparison of strongly 
similar data from a few countries, and a strictly quantitative 
comparison of more countries whose data are less alike? 
Bringing stratification back into mobility research 
RC28's name suggests that mobility inhibits stratification. After 
studying the causes of mobility, it therefore is fitting to return 
to stratification questions. One way of doing so is by asking 
whether differences between strata are smaller if more mobility 
occurs between them. Lipset & Zetterberg (1956) took this road 
when comparing data on origin, destination and voting in three 
industrial nations. · 
However, other stratification questions have a higher logical 
priority. Also, Lipset & Zetterberg's question needs rephrasing 
in the light of later developments. That question is presented 
after four ways - ranging from novel to standard - of 
reverting to stratification questions. One question is the extent 
inequality is lessened by mobility. Another one is how strongly 
reiterated mobility is accompanied by cumulative (dis)ad-
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vantages. A third question is to what extent heterogamy lessens 
inequality. A fourth one is the degree stratum differences are 
larger for persons who are stable in the upper and lower strata 
than for persons moving into them. 
Computing inequality measures for the distribution of in-
dividual scores summed over time 
One answer to Van Heek's second question holds that in a 
particular society the distribution of individuals over its strata 
scores x on some measure for inequality. Pressing forward, it 
may be asked how much less inequality is displayed by a distri-
bution obtained by adding the stratum scores of an individual 
at various points in time than by the already characterized 
distribution for one single moment2. The notion that mobility 
might inhibit stratification has not as yet been implemented in 
this way. 
This question may seem trivial. Yet the idea that mobility 
lessens inequality is not a tautology. It neglects the distinction 
between mobility rates, social fluidity and opportunity 
structure: if everyone's income goes up, and higher incomes go 
up faster, inequality increases. The relationship between 
loglinear parameters for social fluidity and for marginal 
differences is empirical. So is that between fluidity and 
coefficients for overall inequality (inequality in the distribution 
of added individual scores). Given the distribution of individual 
scores at one point in time, the relationship between fluidity 
and total inequality may indeed be a logical one. It is not well-
known and it is underused3. 
This first new question about stratification thus provides a link 
with longstanding questions of economists on income inequality, 
especially those on lifetime income. Answers yield corrections 
of familiar estimates of inequalities obtained from data 
pertaining to one point in time. How much less inequality is 
there in the distribution of scarce goods over a society's 
members after taking mobility into account? 
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Cumulative (dis)aduantages in the mobility process 
When determined by adding scores over two points in time, the 
extent to which mobility reduces inequality may be overstated. 
Mobility between two dates does not preclude mobility over 
more points in time from displaying cumulative outcomes and 
thus strengthening stratification. This potential deception gives 
rise to a second novel question on the extent to which mobility 
inhibits stratification. 
If social fluidity is not complete, a person's stratum at t1 
influences this person's stratum at t2, and a person's stratum 
at t2 that person's stratum at ta. On top of the latter effect, 
the stratum of a person at ta may be influenced by that 
person's stratum at t1. If multiple effects occur, mobility 
processes make for cumulative (dis)advantages. Consequences of 
a low (high) origin reassert themselves. Does reiterated mobility 
display cumulation? 
An afftrmative answer to that question has unwittingly been 
given by path models for the stratification process. In Blau & 
Duncan's (1967: 170) model for the USA one path goes from 
father's occupation to son's first occupation, another from 
father's occupation to son's present occupation, while there is 
also a path from son's first occupation to son's present 
occupation. According to its authors, this model tells about 
achievement and universalism. It tells another story too. 
A model for the Netherlands showed no path from father's job 
to son's present one (Flap & N.D. de Graaf, 1986: 147). Are 
cumulations absent form this country's stratification process? 
No. The same model shows that father's education has a direct 
influence on son's education and present occupation. Also, son's 
education directly affects son's first and present occupation. 
Multiple father effects are present. 
Following Sorensen (1975)4, it is wrong to compare coefficients 
for paths going out from the same variable in standard models 
of the stratification process. Coefficients just do not pertain to 
time intervals that are equal for all sons. For cumulative 
effects of education, it is more fitting to study direct effects 
of education on a person's first job after leaving school, job 
five years later, job after 10 years, etc. Is there a direct 
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effect of a person's education on that person's job so many 
years after completing education, and does that effect decrease 
as the number of years since completing education increases?5 
A pertinent analysis is Ultee, Dessens & Jansen (1988a). It 
answers the question whether someone's (un)employment at the 
end of a three-month period is influenced by this person's 
(un)employment at the beginning of that period, and by this 
person's (un)employment at the start ofthe previous one. The 
authors do so by multiplying two adjacent three-month mobility 
matrices under the assumption of independence, and comparing 
the predicted six-month matrix with the actual one. 
Mobility, openness and heterogamy 
A third new6 question regards mobility as one of several ways 
of constraining stratification. Take the case of father-son 
mobility. A society's strata are open if mobility takes place. 
Now men do not simply have sons. In order for births to take 
place male-female couples must have been formed first. A 
society is also open if spouses come from different strata 7. The 
notion that mobility dampens stratification does not tell it all: 
heterogamy does so too. Or: just as competition in the labour 
market may have an unequal outcome, so may competition in 
the marriage market. 
This suggests the question of how much mobility and heterog-
amy there is in a society. If father-son mobility is absent, 
inequality is "reproduced" from generation to generation. If 
homogamy prevails, it is "reconstituted" within generations. 
Questions on "reproduction" of inequality are to be amalgamated 
with those on its "reconstitution". If a country displays more 
mobility than another country, does it have more heterogamy 
too? Does mobility within a society equal heterogamy, or is it 
higher (lower) than heterogamy? 
By way of questions about heterogamy and mobility, a dilemma 
of the third generation may be avoided. It is that of choosing 
between a small number of countries for which similar data are 
available and a larger number of countries for which dissimilar 
data exist. It is, of course, tempting to opt for the more 
similar data. However, in that case, as the number of alterna-
tive explanations of one and the same phenomenon increases, 
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the degrees of freedom decrease. 
In a similar situation, Campbell (1975) pointed out that if hypo-
theses do not explain just one but several phenomena, degrees 
of freedom increase anew. In this way tests of alternative 
explanations again become possibleS. If hypotheses predict 
numerous phenomena, predictions need not be identical: some 
consequences may be stronger than others. 
Mobility and heterogamy measure up to Campbell's proposal 
for increasing the degrees of freedom. By joining questions on 
these phenomena into an overarching question on openness, 
even with a small number of countries, the dilemma of the 
third generation may be avoided9. Ultee & Luijkx (1989) show 
for 23 industrial nations that as class fluidity increases relative 
chances of educational heterogamy rises too, and that within 
each country fluidity is higher than heterogamy. 
Additional questions may be asked about the extent heterogamy 
diminishes stratification. One question is similar to that about 
the distribution of individual scores added over time: add the 
scores of persons forming one couple, compute the inequality in 
that distribution, and ask how much lower it is than that in 
the distribution of individual scores. This sum is determined 
when economists compute income of families without working 
children. These two questions may be combined: add individual 
scores over time and couples. 
Another additional question is whether there are multiple 
spouse effects. Persons might marry one another because they 
have the same education, and spouse's education might directly 
influence the other's occupation. Ultee, Dessens & Jansen 
(1988b) show multiple spouse effects on unemployment. 
Campbell's proposal may be implemented in two ways that do 
not involve phenomena other than mobility. If more than two 
strata are distinguished, one may improve upon hypotheses 
about effects of country properties for one single fluidity 
parameter for the complete mobility table, by decomposing the 
overall mobility table in all possible adjacent two-by-two tables 
and specifying separate hypotheses about social fluidity in each 
of these tables (Grusky & Hauser, 1984). It is also possible to 
test hypotheses holding that effects of country characteristics 
on fluidity are stronger for certain than for other persons (say, 
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younger versus older persons). Here the models of Mason, Wong 
& Entwistle (1983) are applicable (cf. DiPrete and Grusky, 
1988). This course exploits the fact that hypotheses are multi-
level statements: their units are not only countries, but also 
individuals. 
Micro-effects and Sobel's diagonal models 
The imagery of stratification is rich. It suggests that the 
distribution of individuals over a society's strata at one point 
in time is quite unequal. It hints that stratification advances if 
mobility and heterogamy decrease. And it evokes the effects of 
belonging to some stratum: a society is more strongly stratified 
if the life chances of strata differ widely in several respects. 
A fourth question following on Van Heek's sequence is the 
extent that, for persons who are stable in the higher and lower 
strata, life chances differ more than for persons climbing into 
the upper strata and persons falling to the lower ones. A 
similar question arises about heterogamy. They may be 
combined into one question on the effects of stratum of 
person, spouse and father. 
How are these longstanding questions to be answered? Sobel 
(1981) showed that older techniques do not fit the substance 
of questions about effects of characteristics of persons, spouse 
and father, whereas diagonal models do. 
Sobel argues that diagonal models are applicable to accul-
turation processes. If strata have different values, the question 
arises of what happens to the values of mobile persons. 
According to one hypothesis mobiles will discard the values of 
the stratum they belonged to and adopt the values of their 
destination stratum. For mobile persons, the values of their 
destination are those of persons who are stable in that stratum. 
The values of the stratum a mobile person belonged to are 
those of persons who are stable in the origin stratum of mobile 
persons. Acculturation will not be immediate: the values of 
mobiles will be somewhere between those of their origin and 
destination. A technique squaring with these substantive 
hypotheses takes stable persons as references and estimates 
where exactly between these stables specific mobiles are 
located. Diagonal models do just that. 
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Diagonal models are appropriate too when persons follow their 
interests. Voting may have more to do with interests than 
values. Now persons who are stationary in a stratum have a 
better knowledge of their interests and thus act more strongly 
in accordance with them. Mobile persons, at one time belonging 
to a stratum different from their present one, know their 
current interests less fully and thus act less strongly in 
accordance with them. They come to do so gradually, after 
learning from stable persons what is now in their interests. 
Diagonal models estimate the extent to which mobile persons 
act according to their interests. 
Diagonal models are also applicable to ''hard" consequences of 
background characteristics. A person's health is affected by 
involuntary and unavoidable exposure to toxicants. Low prestige 
jobs may involve more such exposure. Persons stable in a low 
prestige job for a long time have been exposed, while those 
stable in a high prestige job have not been exposed. The health · 
of mobile persons will be somewhere between that of those 
stable in their origin and that of those stable in their 
destination. This argument applies to intragenerational mobility, 
intergenerational mobility and heterogamy. It holds if toxicants 
have delayed, irreversible, or carry-over effects. Diagonal 
models apply to data on health and person's, spouse's and 
father's stratum. 
Macro-effects of total mobility and opportunity structure 
Van Heek distinguished between consequences of mobility on 
individual adjustment and group solidarity. Goldthorpe (1980: 
18-20) connected prestige mobility with individual strains, and 
class mobility with class formation. However, individual effects 
of mobility (for instance, on mental and physical health) and 
social consequences of mobility (say, electoral outcome) are not 
mutually exclusive. Past and present stratum affect individual 
voting behavior, which is then transformed into an electoral 
outcome (a macro-effect). The consequences of past and present 
stratum on the health of individuals in the end imply diseases 
disproportionately striking certain strata (another macro-effect). 
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Macro-consequences of mobility on, say, electoral outcomes 
depend on the individual relationship between mobility and 
voting and the pertinent aspect of a country's mobility pattern. 
Lipset & Zetterberg asked if mobility shifts election results to 
the right. Nowadays total mobility, social fluidity and compet-
itive balance are distinguished. How is Lipset & Zetterberg's 
question to be restated? 
N.D. de Graaf & Ultee (1989) start from two hypotheses on 
individual consequences of past and present stratum on voting 
behavior. According to one, economic interests of an individual 
are dominant. According to another, status is the main motive. 
Both hypotheses allow consequences of belonging to another 
stratum at an earlier point in time. While these effects are the 
same for upwardly mobiles, they differ for downwardly mobiles. 
If voting is a matter of economic interests, downwardly mobiles 
soon act according to their new interests. If status is 
dominant, downwardly mobiles are reluctant to admit sliding 
down the social scale, and in the meantime hang on to their 
old voting behavior. 
Moving on from the micro- to the macro-level, N.D. de Graaf & 
Ultee show with numerical examples that if economic interests 
are dominant, the percentage favouring a party depends on a 
country's opportunity structure. If status motives prevail, total 
mobility is operative. The last new question for Van Reek's 
sequence is whether total mobility or opportunity structure 
influences electoral outcomes. 
An improved and extended sequence 
This paragraph's arguments for improving and extending Van 
Reek's sequence of stratification and mobility questions, after 
some rearranging, may now be summed up in the following new 
sequence: 
1. In studies with limited time and money, with which 
yardsticks are the inhabitants of a society to be divided 
into strata? 
2. How much inequality is displayed by the distribution 
of its members over these strata at one point in time? 
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3. To what extent do persons move between and marry 
across strata? 
4. Which factors influence this mobility and this hetero-
gamy? 
5. How much more (or less) inequality is displayed by the 
distribution of its members over these strata at one point 
in time than by the distribution obtained by adding 
stratum scores for individuals over time and couples? 
6. Does a person's first stratum have cumulative 
consequences on this person's later strata? Are there 
multiple effects of spouse's stratum? 
7. To what extent are a person's life chances influenced 
by this person's present stratum, and by the stratum of 
this person's father and spouse? 
8. Does a country's electoral outcome shift to the right 
as total mobility increases, or as opportunity structures 
become more favorable? 
The next paragraph seeks to answer some questions of this 
sequence, with Dutch data sets. 
Analytical exercises 
How far do mobility and heterogamy reduce inequality? 
Given interval measurement of occupational prestige, one 
yardstick for inequality in a prestige distribution is the 
standard deviation. That statistic is now presented. 
Study P0839 of the Steinmetz Archive in Amsterdam is the data 
set of a survey conducted in 1982 among a random sample of 
Dutch males aged between 18 and 65 years. It contains respon-
dent's occupation at time of marriage, the occupation of this 
person's wife at time of marriage, that of this person's father 
when the respondent was 12 years old, and year of marriage. 
All four variables were available for 237 respondents. To 
determine trends, respondents were divided into four cohorts: 
married between 1943 and 1952, married between 1953 and 1962, 
between 1963 and 1972, and between 1973 and 1982. Job titles 
were recoded into prestige scores ranging from 13 to 87 (Sixma 
& Ultee 1984a). 
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Table 1 
Standard deviations for marriage cohorts in the distribution of 
(1) occupational prestige of males, (2) average prestige of males 
and father, (3) average prestige of males and wife, (4) average 
prestige of males, wife and father; and reductions in standard 
deviations for marriage cohorts: (5) for males plus father 
versus for males only, (6) for males plus wife versus males 
only, (7) for males plus father and wife versus males only. 
cohort I I (1) I (2) I (3) I (4) I (5) r (6) I (7) I n I 
============================================================= 
43-52 II 18.9 16.1 15.1 14.1 .85 .80 • 75 26 
53-62 I I 18.8 15.8 13.1 12.8 .84 .70 .68 46 
63-72 II 18.1 14.7 14.1 12.7 .81 .78 .70 92 
73-82 II 17.6 13.7 12.5 11.0 .78 • 71 .63 79 
II 
all II 18.1 14.7 13.5 12.3 .81 .75 .68 237 
============================================================= 
Column 1 ofTable 1 gives the standard deviation of the distri-
bution of respondent's occupational prestige for four cohorts. 
The standard deviation decreases as year of marriage increases, 
thus showing a lessening of inequality in the course of time. 
No significance test was performed. 
To answer the question of how unequal occupational prestige 
is distributed after taking mobility and heterogamy into 
account, three computations were performed. Respondent's and 
father's prestige were added and divided by two, and so were 
respondent's and partner's prestige. Respondent's, father's and 
partner's prestige were summed and divided by three. The 
standard deviations of the resulting distributions are shown in 
colUlllns 2 through 4 of Table 1. Two colUlllns show a decrease 
in standard deviation, while one column contains an exception 
to a trend towards a reduction of inequality. 
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To answer the question of the extent mobility and heterogamy 
reduce initial inequality, standard deviations in columns 2 
through 4 were divided by those in column 1, resulting in 
columns 5 through 7. Heterogamy reduces inequality more than 
mobility. An emerging rule of thumb holds that mobility reduces 
inequality by a fifth, heterogamy by a quarter, and mobility 
plus heterogamy by a third. Reductions in recent cohorts seem 
larger than in older ones. 
Findings on the Netherlands show that income inequality 
decreased (Hartog & Veenbergen, 1978), and that educational 
heterogamy (as loglinear parameters for cell frequencies, Sixma 
& Ultee, 1984b), class fluidity (Ganzeboom et al., 1987) and 
occupational prestige fluidity (Ganzeboom & P. de Graaf, 1984) 
increased. If these fmdings were made with one single criterion 
of stratification and other things remained equal, they might 
logically imply that overall inequality decreased. However, 
fmdings were not made this way. Also, other things did not 
remain equal: marginal differences of mobility tables changed, 
but changes cannot be described by simple parameters 
(Ganzeboom & P. de Graaf, 1984), while opportunities for 
marrying a person with equal education increased (Sixma & 
Ultee, 1984b). This paper's fmdings show that overall inequality 
in occupational prestige in the Netherlands had decreased since 
the second world war. Mobility and heterogamy contributed to 
this decline. 
Reiterated mobility and cumulation of(dis)adpantages? 
Steinmetz Archive Study P0839 contains data on all jobs held 
by males. They were used to answer questions about reiterated 
mobility and cumulation of disadvantages. Given the small 
number of cases, no cohorts were compared. Analysis remained 
limited to those 212 cases for which years of schooling, 
prestige of first job, of occupation after 10 years, and of job 
20 years later were available. Prestige was measured according 
to Sixma & Ultee (1984a). 
Figure 1 gives the resulting unconventional path model of the 
stratification process. Years of schooling significantly (at the 
.05 level) affects job prestige at all three career points. Its 
effects decrease with the passage of time. The direct path from 
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ftrst job to that after 20 years is borderline significant at the 
.10 level (which is remarkable given the few cases and high 
zero-order correlations). Multiple effects of schooling are found 
too. Those who already have higher occupational prestige, will 
obtain even more prestige as a consequence. Those starting out 
in a job with low prestige, remain in a low-prestige job. 
Figure 1 
Standardized effects of education for occupational prestige at 
time of entering the labor market, after 10 years, and after 20 
years, Dutch males in 1982 
1.57 
prestige . 65 first job -------'-----) 
.68 
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prestige job 
10 years later 
.59 
• 12 
.491 
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prestige job 
20 years later 
.14 
Father and spouse effects on health? 
Study P0761 in the Steinmetz Archive stems from 1983 and 
contains data on health (a checklist of 27 chronic and other 
serious illnesses), and respondent's, spouse's, and father's 
education. These data on one of the most valued goods in life 
are used to answer the question whether a person's health is 
affected by these factors. To circumvent the difficulty that 
health affects job, the focus is on education. 
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illtee, N.D. de Graaf & Van Puijenbroek (1988) applied the 
following diagonal model to 2628 cases from this flle: 
Yhijk = Uhij + Ehijki (1) 
uhi· = f.uhhh +. s.um + r.tljjj (2) 
(a) lb. = 1,2,3,4; 1 = 1,2,3,4; J = 1,2,3,4; k = 1, .. , nhiji 
(b) f + s + r = 1; 
(c) ~~1; O~sQ.; O~r~1. 
In these equations, Yhijk is the value of the criterion variable 
in the case of k observations for the cell hij of a mobility plus 
heterogamy table. Subscript h stands for father's education, i 
for spouse's education, andj for respondent's education. The 
expression uhii indicates the population average on the 
criterion variaole for observations in cell hij, Ehijk is a 
stochastic term with 0 as expected value. Expressions uhhh, uiii 
and t1jjj are population averages for cells hhh, iii and jjj. 
There are four levels of education. The influence of father's 
education is given by f, that of spouse's education by s, and 
that of respondent's own education by r. These effects are 
made to sum to unity. 
Results of fitting this model are liS follows. With 2621 df, the 
residual mean square is 2.11861. uu1 is estimated at 1.84, u222 
at .98, u333 at 1.06, and u444 at .65 illnesses. The value ofr 
turns out to be .64, s takes on the value of .26, while f is .10. 
The last coefficient is barely twice its standard error, the 
others are decidedly so. A person's health is primarily 
influenced by person's own education, then by the education of 
person's spouse, and only slightly by the education of person's 
father. 
Does electoral outcome depend on total mobility or 
opportunity structure? 
Lipset & Zetterberg asked whether mobility shifts a country's 
political balance to the right. Since total mobility, social 
fluidity and opportunity structure are now distinguished, the 
question arises which of these phenomena influence electoral 
outcome. The answer requires comparative research. However, 
178 
Lipset & Zetterberg's macro-hypothesis may be derived from 
individual hypotheses about the influence on voting behaviour 
of person's and father's strata, and additional assumptions 
about total mobility, fluidity or opportunity structure. Micro-
explanations of macro-hypotheses provide opportunities for 
testing that do not require comparative research. 
In one such test, N.D. DeGraaf & Ultee (1989) estimate two 
diagonal models on data obtained by pooling three Dutch 
election surveys from the seventies (studies P0136 and P0354 
from the Steinmetz Archives, the fll'st study containing two 
separate surveys). Names of political parties preferred by 1585 
males were converted to scores on a seven point left-right 
scale. Six categories were delimited for occupational prestige of 
these males and their fathers. 
The fll'st diagonal model estimated the fit of the hypothesis 
that the economic interests of a male's present and past strata 
affect individual voting behaviour. Its equations, with notation 
as previously, are: 
Yhjk = Uhj + Ehjk; (3) 
uh· = f.uhh + r.Uji (4) 
(d¥ h = 1,2,3,4,0,6 ;j = 1,2,3,4,5,6; k= 1, ..... ,nij; 
(e) f + r = 1; 
(f) ~ f~1. 
Equations for the hypothesis that individual voting behavior is 
influenced by the status motives of this person's current and 
previous strata, run as follows: 
Yhjk = Uhj + Ehjk; 
uhj = f.uhh + r.Ujj, 
uhj = r.uhh + f.Ujj, 
(3) 
ifh < j (5) 
ifh > j (6). 
Now as to the fit of these models. The economic interest 
model, with 1578 df's, had a residual mean square of 1.65012, 
while the status motives model, with the same df's, had a fit 
of 1.65344. The economic interest model therefore provided a 
better fit. The estimated u-parameters of the best fitting model 
were 2.93, 3.81, 3.95, 4.51, 4.36 and 4.51 (all twice their 
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standard error). The £-parameter was estimated at .66. Father's 
stratum is more influential than person's stratum! 
These results for the Netherlands answer the question whether 
electoral outcome depends on total mobility or opportunity 
structure. If the status motive hypothesis also holds for other 
decades than the seventies, electoral outcome changed as 
opportunity structures developed, not as total mobility 
fluctuated. Since mobility necessitated by opportunity structures 
is almost always smaller than total mobility, and since Lipset & 
Zetterberg only paid attention to total mobility, the shift to 
the right in a country's political balance as a consequence of 
mobility may have been overstated in earlier generations of 
RC28. 
Condusion: theoretical sociology and tire field of inequality, 
openness and cumulation 
This paper was about questions in the field of stratification 
and mobility, not about explanations and theories in that area. 
It was not an exercise in theoretical sociology, but a specimen 
of- if one may say so - "problematic sociology". It redrew the 
map of stratification and mobility as that of inequalities, 
openness, and cumulations. 
The field of stratification and mobility is a central part of the 
discipline of sociology. Those in theoretical sociology take a 
natural interest in its development. Their judgement is that 
changes all too often amount to application of the latest 
technique for its own sake. This opinion, as this paper 
hopefully has made clear, is mistaken. Methods have been 
replaced, but new procedures answered old and novel substan-
tive questions. These questions include questions raised against 
the background of discussions in theoretical sociology. To 
conclude this paper, a review is given of the links between the 
questions sequenced in this paper and three of these exchanges 
- the resurgence of marxism in the early seventies, the rise of 
neo-weberianism in the late seventies and early eighties, and 
the present micro-macro debate. An afterthought is added on 
explanations the programme of providing micro-foundations for 
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macro-sociology might have in store for the field of strati-
fication and mobility. 
In the early seventies various strands of neo-marxist and 
marxisant theorizing attacked established sociology. According 
to Goldthorpe (1980) their criticism of the field of RC28 is to 
some extent responsible for the shift from questions on occupa-
tional prestige mobility to questions on occupational class 
mobility. Several questions of this paper's sequence follow up 
on this change. 
Although a move towards class mobility has been justified by 
the argument that questions of class formation are otherwise 
neglected, these questions have not until now been addressed 
by way of comparative research on the micro- and macro-
consequences of mobility on class differences in health, class 
identification, class imagery, trade union membership, voting, or 
other indicators of class formation. This paper's sequence not 
only gave a prominent place to questions on class formation, 
but also provided answers obtained by a technique better suited 
to substantive questions. 
This paper also displayed an interest in inequality, another 
phenomenon focussed by neo-marxism. Bourdieu (1970, 1982) and 
his circle (Desrosie' res 1978) not only raised questions on 
"reproduction of class inequality" between generations, but also 
on what might be called "reconstitution of inequality" within 
generations. This paper's sequence of questions contains one 
question comprising mobility and heterogamy. 
Neo-weberianism followed neo-marxism in theoretical sociology. 
This paper's argument that there might be more than 67 
varieties of mobility is rooted in neo-weberianism. An array of 
mobility questions is generated by its individualistic core that a 
person's resources influence that person's life chances. It is 
rendered manageable by the additional statement that means of 
production, destruction and persuasion are prime resources (cf. 
Runciman 1989), and another one holding that health and life 
expectancy, income and living standard, and culture and life 
style are major aspects of a person's life chances (cf. Ultee 
1984). 
Another neo-weberian statement is pertinent to this paper's 
questions on mobility and heterogamy. In various passages 
Weber (1920: 32-45 and 132, and 1921: 177-182) conceives of 
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stratification as a process of closure passing through various 
stages10. This notion attracted less attention from early Weber 
commentators than explicit statements about classes, estates 
and parties (Weber 1921: 177-182 and 531-540). It stands 
behinds this paper's overarchlng question about the state of 
openness - or the process of closure. 
The specifics of the notion that stratification is a process of 
closure with various stages are as follows. To maintain their 
position, guilds in Europe during the middle ages restricted 
access by way of quota. Rules still allowed apprentices free 
choice of a master. In this way occupational inheritance 
remained limited. In India with its caste system, occupations 
were always inherited. Despite rivalries between guilds in the 
West, conviviality between them was widespread. Marriages 
between various guilds took place. Although in Europe 
marriages between estates were infrequent, if these marriages 
took place, no legal (and certainly no religious) punishments 
were applied. In India meals and marriages between castes were 
absent, and forbidden by religion. 
These observations can be reformulated into a general neo-
weberian statement. To protect attained advantages, those fa-
vourably placed take short-term measures that, if successful, as 
a by-product maintain inequality and limit occupational 
mobility. In the long run occupational inheritance becomes 
formalized. Also, marriage outside one's own occupation 
becomes infrequent. In the end outmarriage carries, apart from 
a legal punishment, a religious penalty. And: if stratification 
relaxes, mobility increases frrst, while outmarriage increases 
only later. This neo-weberian statement adds precision to 
questions on openness: does more mobility than heterogamy 
take place between a society's strata, and does a factor making 
for more mobility increase heterogamy less strongly? 
Right now the micro-macro debate is being staged in theoreti-
cal sociology. Opponents of an autonomous macro-sociology 
have justified their enterprise by pointing towards paradoxical 
macro-effects emerging from individual actionsll. This paper 
has postulated two of these effects with respect to stratifica-
tion and mobility. The frrst is that reiterated mobility is 
accompanied by cumulation, the second that social fluidity does 
not shift a country's political balance. 
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These paradoxical macro-effects not only yield novel questions 
in the field of stratification and mobility, but also touch upon 
new explanations. To fmish this paper with some theoretical 
sociology proper: what are the prospects for constructing 
micro-explanations of macro-phenomena in the field of 
stratification and mobility? 
The programme of providing micro-foundations for macro-
sociology may hold more promises for new predictions on 
stratification and mobility than neo-marxism and neo-weberian-
ism. Revivals are not renewals. Yet, so far, few macro-
structures have been erected on micro-foundations. Becker 
(1981) provided old predictions on mobility and heterogamy. 
Olson (1982: 256-257) selectively quoted fmdings on differences 
in mobility between countries. 
There may be a special reason why the micro-macro debate 
has not yielded much for the field of stratification and 
mobility. The hypotheses in that area are mostly multi-level 
statements, statements taking both individuals and societies as 
their units. However, the micro-macro debate hinges on the 
distinction between statements pertaining to individuals and 
those referring to societies. In this way, statements actually 
occurring in a particular field are ignored, although they have 
a role in bridging the micro-macro gap12. 
To take an example. There is not much difference between this 
multi-level statement with societies as its prime unit: 
"societies with more generous governmental scholarships 
for children from lower strata display more upward 
mobility by children from these strata than societies with 
less generous ones". 
and the next multi-level one principally about individuals: 
"children from the lower strata living in societies whose 
governments offer them more generous scholarships will 
be more upwardly mobile than children from these strata 
in societies whose governments offer them less generous 
scholarships", 
However, this argument cuts two ways. There are different 
kinds of multi-level statements with individuals as their 
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principal unit. To continue the example: there is an important 
difference between the just presented multi-level statement 
principally about individuals, and the following multi-level 
statement also with individuals as its main unit: 
"children from the lower strata in a society whose 
government offers them more generous scholarships, will 
attain a higher education, and they who in this way 
obtained it also will reach a higher occupation, resulting 
in more upward mobility for children from the lower 
strata''. 
Moving on to the last statement ensues some progress. Whereas 
the first statement postulated an association between macro-
factors, and the second one at best hinted at an intervening 
variable, the last one pinpoints a mechanism between them, 
yielding new testable predictions. This paper's question about 
mobility and voting was obtained this way. 
Within the field of stratification and mobility itself there is 
something of a drift from macro-explanations towards multi-
level ones. At this moment the macro-hypothesis that a 
country's mobility pattern is influenced by its economic 
development and political climate, is being replaced by the 
multi-level hypothesis that a person's mobility is affected by 
life-cycle, cohort and period factors (compare Grusk.y & Hauser, 
1984 with Blossfeld, 1986; see also DiPrete & Grusk.y 1988, N.D. 
de Graaf 1988). Restating macro-hypotheses as micro-ones with 
contextual characteristics, is the easy part of executing the 
programme of providing micro-foundations for a macro-
sociology. Multi-level hypotheses do not equal micro-explana-
tions. Indeed, Blossfeld intended no such thing. 
To provide micro-foundations for macro-sociology, existing 
macro-hypotheses are to be corrected by an explanation that 
unifies them. Following this mjunction, a country's economic 
development may be taken as an instance of a structural 
constraint produced by economic markets, and a country's 
political climate as an instance of a structural constraint 
provided by a political collective actor. These assumptions 
reduce two macro-factors to the same denominator. 
Are these assumptions tenable? Does this subsumption yield 
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new measurements of economic development and political 
climate? What interesting predictions may be derived? Do 
micro-foundations indicate that one structural constraint is 
more effective than another? Which joint effects do these 
constraints have? Are the cultural traditions stressed by neo-
weberianism structural constraints too? The programme of 
providing micro-foundations for macro-sociology does not 
provide much guidance on these points. In fact, classical 
sociology - with its emphasis on monopolized markets, the state 
and traditions - has a richer imagery of structural constraints 
than this programme, which is new to sociology but has roots 
in neo-classical economics and shares a focus on free markets 
with the founders of economics. 
By moving on from economic level and political climate as 
macro-factors to life-cycle, cohort and period as contextual 
individual properties, correcting predictions have been derived 
(Blossfeld 1986). An example is the prediction that a person's 
occupational prestige at a certain date, is not only influenced 
by the economic development of this person's country at that 
time, but also by the unemployment level in that country when 
the person first entered the labour market. 
Yet doing away with macro-factors and bringing in contextual 
characteristics makes the task of laying micro-foundations for 
macro-sociology more exacting. Life-cycle, cohort and period 
comprise more factors than economic development and political 
climate. How to incorporate them? Is each and every one a 
structural constraint? What is their ranking after effectiveness? 
Like the sequencing of questions, theory construction in the 
field of stratification and mobility - or as this paper argued: 
the field of inequalities, openness, and cumulations - remains a 
do-it-yourself matter. 
Notes 
(1) A principle of charity is applied in representing Van Heek's 
sequence after 44 years. Having answered the first question by 
opting for occupational prestige, Van Heek' s second one was 
about differences in prestige between strata, not about 
differences in occupational prestige between individuals. When 
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actually answering the second question, Van Heek saw that 
lumping occupational titles into various strata is quite 
arbitrary, and that a straight run of individuals after occupa-
tional prestige is the interesting thing. 
(2) This proposal is applicable only to interval measures. 
(3) The question of how to partition frequencies for total 
mobility into frequencies for circulation and for structural 
mobility has been rendered out of date by loglinear models. The 
real question behind it may be how halfway parameters, 
parameters for structural differences and parameters for social 
fluidity combine into some measure for overall inequality. This 
is not the place to go into this matter. 
(4) S{rensen (1975) recognized that the standard question of 
how much mobility there is in a society at a certain point in 
time contains an ambiguity. The notion of mobility in itself 
refers to movements between two points in timeThe new 
question is how much mobility there is between t1 and t2, for 
all members of a society at t1 and t2. 
(5) To answer this question, event analysis- the technique 
now favoured by Sirensen- is unnecessary. Hauser (1977) 
showed that regression models with auto- and lagged effects 
are sufficient. Given job histories, Hauser's model goes beyond 
Blau & Duncan's (1967: 184) syrithetic cohort model. 
(6) Old mobility monographs often studied heterogamy. 
However, comparative heterogamy is not now an established 
topic, and opportunities for testing provided by questions about 
mobility and heterogamy have not been exploited. 
(7) How open or closed a society's strata are, is indicated by 
similarity within father-son and husband-wife dyads, but also 
by similarity within dyads of siblings and of friends. 
(8) To assess consequences of higher income in a small sample 
of manual workers, Goldthorpe et al. (1969) in effect followed 
Campbell's strategy by distinguishing the political, normative 
and relational aspects of embourgeoisement. 
(9) Collection of job histories and their mapping by way of 
event analysis is another way out of this dilenu:na. This 
strategy increases the number of mobility tables. (If the 
minimum length ofajob spell has been put at one year, event 
analysis amounts to making every possible one-year mobility 
table and summing them. This, incidentally, does away with the 
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choice between taking events or individuals as the unit of 
analysis.) With more tables, degrees of freedom rise (thus 
allowing separation of life-cycle, cohort and period effects). 
Since existing data sets seldom contain job histories, whereas 
data on heterogamy are more readily available, proposals differ 
in applicability. Pragmatic arguments guided reformulation of 
Van Reek's first question, and here again enter into programm-
ing of questions. 
(10) In the British debate neither Parkin (1974) nor Murphy 
(1988) focused upon closure as a process with various stages. 
(11) This particularly holds for the French discussion (Boudon, 
1977). 
(12) This at least holds for the German debate. Raub (1984: 
38, footnote 11) argues away multi-level statements. Hummell 
& Opp (1971) did allow contextual characteristics. But they 
defined statements as individual (collective), if their units are 
individuals (collectives). They thus failed to appreciate reinter-
pretion of absolute properties as relational or contextual ones 
(and global properties as structural or analytical ones) as a 
strategy for theory construction. 
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